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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we assess the potential impacts of different airport charges schemes that can be applied in 
Madrid Barajas airport. We use a model that has already been applied in the literature to calculate the 
social welfare of the different price regimes. The term social welfare refers to the social welfare generated 
from only aeronautical services, while the social welfare created from non-aeronautical activities will not 
be discussed here. We define, as is common in the literature, that the social welfare is the sum of 
consumer surplus and producer surplus. We analyze the potential impact of different pricing policies 
using the values obtained on social welfare, and using the concept of ‘potential loss of social welfare’ 
when the lack of adequate capacity preclude the potential demand from using the airport. Thus, we 
evaluate the “losses” or “gains” of each alternative pricing policy. Our results may contribute to the on-
going debate in Madrid and around Europe about the merits of adjusting airport charges to different 
scenarios, e.g. congestion or lack of capacity or excess of capacity, in which airports are usually involved. 
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Introduction 
 
Barajas airport is the principal gateway of the Spanish airport system. In 2003 it 
moved a total of 35 million passengers, and accounted for 27% of air traffic between the 
EU and South America. Some analysts have foreseen that future air deregulation in 
Europe, the United States of America and Asia will continue to put pressure on the 
Spanish airport system. In the face of this situation, the government has given high 
priority to airport infrastructure expansion plans. The capacity expansion programme 
for Barajas airport will change the present capacity of 80 air traffic movements per hour 
up to 120 air traffic movements in two different phases. The first one will increase the 
capacity up to 100 movements and it is expected to be finished at the beginning of 
winter 2005,  the second one will definitely increase the capacity up to 120 movements 
and new aircraft could land and take-off at the beginning from the winter 2006. At the 
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opening of the new facilities, Barajas airport will have a design capacity of 80 million 
passengers per year with four runways and four passengers’ terminal buildings. 
A brief characterization of the air traffic at Madrid airport would read as follows: 
strong domestic linkages with simultaneous concentration of passenger volume on the 
main routes, primarily the routes to and from Barcelona, and other domestic routes to 
some industrial or tourist cities of Spain being Iberia the principal incumbent airline; 
strong European Union traffic less concentrated than the domestic one but with 
important linkages with the principal capital cities of Europe, in which Iberia share its 
incumbent role with other former flag carriers such as British Airways, TAP, KLM and 
Air France; and finally the densest intercontinental traffic is highly specialized in the 
trans-Atlantic routes to the United States and Latin America, with  Iberia again the 
principal incumbent airline in this market. It is against this background that the airport 
authorities of Spain (AENA) have planned the most ambitious expansion programme 
that would allow the airport to double its present capacity. 
In this paper, we study the impacts of slot allocation and slot pricing. We study these 
issues applying a model that has already been used in the literature (Starkie (1998), and 
Zhang and Zhang (1997)). We define, as is common in the literature, that social welfare 
is the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, government revenue and externalities, 
and we analyze the potential impact of different pricing policies using the values 
obtained on social welfare, and using the concept of ‘potential loss or gains of social 
welfare’ developed by Lu and Pagliari (2004) when the lack of adequate capacity 
preclude the potential demand from using the airport.  
We compare distinct pricing policies, such as the optimal airport charge (“first best 
prices”), “second best prices” in which the financial constraint of cost recovery is 
considered for each period, and the “market clearing prices”, in which airport capacity 
is used at its maximum levels, and actual prices. Our results should contribute to the on-
going debate in Madrid and around Europe about the merits of adjusting airport charges 
to each situation in which airports may be involved. 
 
 
Slot allocation and pricing 
 
Insufficient runway capacity cause major airports delay problems around the world. 
Disequilibrium between capacity and demand has been explained by failure to properly 
price runway use. Charges at most airports are proportional to aircraft weight and 
invariant with respect to time of day. This practice disincentives airlines to consolidate 
traffic onto large planes, and also ignores the loss in capacity that comes from the 
greater in-trail separation requirements and slower approach speeds of small aircraft.  
Airport slot allocation is necessary when demand for airport’s services exceeds its 
capacity. This may be resolved in different manners, through congestion causing 
important economic inefficiencies, or through more efficient mechanisms to allocate the 
scarce capacity, such as slot auctions. Slot allocation issues have been discussed greatly 
in the literature, while these issues are really important it is necessary to take into 
account the strong links that exist between slot allocation and slot pricing mechanisms. 
Many airports have been privatised and subsequently disposed to regulation to avoid the 
exertion of monopoly power. Price regulation restrains the levels of prices an airport 
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may charge, and for this reason it may not be possible to rely entirely on price 
mechanisms to ration the airport capacity. 
Levine (1969) argues that pricing is a better means of allocating scarce airport 
capacity than other mechanisms being considered at the time, such as slot allocation. 
Carlin and Park (1970) estimated the marginal delay costs at various airports, 
concluding that in many cases these exceed actual charges by a factor of 10. Morrison 
(1983) computed optimal landing charges and investment levels at several US airports, 
finding similar disparities between actual charges and short-run marginal costs, but 
somewhat smaller ones when long-run marginal costs (which assume optimal runway 
capacity) are considered. 
Doganis (1991) examines the impacts of peak pricing at London Heathrow Airport on 
airline schedules, finding that changes in the time period when peak charges were in 
effect resulted in the anticipated shift in flight schedule. Barret et al. (1994) considers 
the effect of a hypothetical peak-period pricing scheme –in which all capacity-related 
airline costs are allocated to peak period operations- on airline schedules for Boston’s 
Logan Airport. They argue that effects on jet airline schedules would be negligible 
because the cost differences would be less than $1.00 per passenger. Commuter flights, 
on the other hand, would face substantial increases in cost per passenger during peak 
periods, which would in some cases lead to flight cancellations. Altogether, they 
estimate that the proposed pricing scheme would decrease peak period flights by 7 
percent but peak period seats by only 3 percent. Daniel (1995), focusing on hub airports 
where flight schedules of arrivals and departures are more complex, proposes a 
bottleneck model (as originally proposed by Vickrey (1969)) in which airlines trade 
delay against the cost of scheduling flights away from peak times. The model assumes 
that, in the absence of differential pricing, the sum of delay and schedule deviation cost 
is equal throughout the peak. Adding a fee that reflects external congestion costs (as 
estimated using a stochastic queuing model with time-dependent demand) induces a 
more even schedule and a 50 percent reduction in delays. Hansen (2002) analyzed 
runway delay externalities at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) using a 
deterministic queuing model. The model estimates the delay impact of each specific 
arriving flight on each other specific arriving flight. He found that, despite being only 
moderately congested (average queuing delay only 4 min per arriving flight), individual 
flights can generate as much as 3 aircraft-hours of external delay impact on other 
flights, with an average impact of 26 aircraft-minutes and 3400 seat-minutes. About 90 
percent of this impact is external to the airline as well as the flight, a consequence of the 
lack of a dominant airline at LAX. He also compared the delay impact of each 
individual flight to its contribution to schedule convenience by determining the amount 
of ‘‘schedule delay’’ that would result if the flight were eliminated and its passengers 
forced to use the previous flight flown by the same airline from the same origin, finding 
that a number of commuter flights serving high density, short-haul segments generate 
much more queuing delay than they save in schedule delay, with the ratio exceeding 10 
in several cases. Thus, he argued that social welfare would increase if such flights were 
eliminated, upsizing others as necessary to accommodate the displaced loads. 
It is relevant to mention that current slot allocation schemes are really controversial, 
and airport charges that cleared the market for landing slots are frequently invoked as a 
better mechanism to promote more efficient outcomes. 
However this issue is not exempt from criticisms, because it is not necessarily true 
that airport operators are the best option to reap the scarcity rents, and other important 
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facts are not analyzed in this context, such as, congestion externalities and revenue 
complementarities for non-aeronautical activities. 
 
 
Madrid Barajas airport 
 
This section discusses recent traffic trends at Madrid Barajas International Airport 
(MAD) and their implications both for the role that slot pricing could have played in the 
year 2004 and the potential for changes in social welfare due to different price policies 
or scenarios. The section first addresses the overall trends in traffic by type of carrier, 
then it examines three specific markets in more detail (domestic markets served 
predominantly by national airlines, Iberia and Spanair, traffic in the European Union, 
and the rest of international air traffic markets). These markets have been selected for 
more detailed examination because of their importance for different types of regulation. 
The national airlines operate the smallest aircraft, and a relatively small proportion of 
the total passenger traffic at the airport is carried by large aircraft operations. Clearly, a 
significant change in average aircraft size by regional airlines could have a big impact 
on the total number of operations. Spanish domestic markets are characterized notably 
both for the high volume of traffic and the high frequency of service. At the same time, 
they are typically operated with relative small aircraft, of the order of 91 passengers per 
air traffic movement. Accommodating traffic growth in these markets through increases 
in average aircraft size would still provide frequent service while reducing the growth in 
aircraft operations, especially at certain hours of the day. Finally, there is considerable 
discussion in the industry about the future prospects for new large aircraft, with seating 
capacity greater than the current Boeing 747-400 (e.g. Franke, 2004; O’Connor, 2003). 
Such aircrafts are most likely to be deployed on very long haul international services, 
such as the trans-Atlantic markets, where stage lengths favour larger aircraft and time-
zone differences create limited time windows for efficient service, which reduces the 
frequency advantages of using smaller aircraft1. In fact, it is also important to recognise 
that a small number of global gateway cities will remain the dominant feature of this 
trans-continental market. For the year 2000, the airports in three city-regions, London, 
New York and Chicago, accounted for more than 30% of the total passenger movement 
through the trans-Atlantic market. The continued role of these big city regions will keep 
the development and management of airport infrastructure at the forefront of airport 
planning in the immediate future. However, the introduction of large capacity planes, 
like new Airbus 380, may break this observed trend. In this sense, the Spanish airport 
authority AENA considers that Madrid Barajas may play an important role in the near 
future. 
The growth in passenger traffic at MAD, since 1970, shows that all market segments 
have experienced traffic growth including international, European Union and domestic 
                                                 
1 Franke (2004) sustains that for the short and medium term future, it would seem impossible for a 
reasonable intercontinental destination portfolio to be served without a hub. To fill an Airbus 380 and 
benefit from its huge unit cost advantages, a carrier still needs to bundle demand for one destination from 
several origins. Furthermore, passengers accept transfers on intercontinental rather than continental trips. 
Since major carriers can operate intercontinental routes on a profitable basis, hubs (and thus hub-and-
spoke carriers) will remain. Nonetheless, the author also anticipates that down-sizing and reshaping of the 
hub-and-spoke landscape is probable. 
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traffic. Less obvious perhaps is the fact that different patterns of growth are observed 
through this period of time, for example some passenger traffic of new entrant domestic 
airlines, such as Spanair and Air Europa have also grown faster than the domestic traffic 
of the incumbent large airline Iberia. For convenience in discussion, and to conform to 
common industry terminology, the large airlines will be referred to as air carriers 
(Iberia, Air France, Spanair and Air Europa), as distinct from the regional airlines, such 
as Air Nostrum. 
As expected, the average number of passengers per air carrier and regional airline 
operation varies significantly between the different markets (domestic, European Union 
and international operations), as shown in Table 1. International operations include both 
long-haul flights to other European countries not included in the European Union and 
flights to Canada, Asia, the United States, Africa and Latin America, which typically 
use similar aircraft to those used in some European Union operations. In consequence, 
the average number of passengers per international operation lies between 140 and 200, 
and are above 200 for trans-oceanic international flights. The average number of 
passengers per operation for Madrid-Barcelona for Iberia has been 105 for the year 
2002. The average number of passengers per operation for other domestic traffic has 
shown figures between 93 for the pair Madrid-Bilbao for Iberia and 160 for the pair 
Madrid-Las Palmas for Iberia. 
 
Table 1: Average Passengers per Operation (APO) from/to Madrid (2002). 
Airline Airport APO 
Iberia New York 207 
Iberia Havana 305 
Iberia Buenos Aires 286.8 
Iberia Tenerife 194.33 
Iberia Bilbao 93.71 
Air Europa Barcelona 112.41 
Iberia London 133.38 
Iberia Paris 108.56 
Air France Paris 92.46 
Iberia Las Palmas 160.53 
Iberia Malaga 131.36 
Spanair Barcelona 92.61 
Iberia Barcelona 105.21 
Source: Martín J.C. and Betancor, O. (2004). 
 
If we examine the results for the year 2002, in terms of traffic for the ten largest 
airline markets for each type of traffic (see Tables 2-4), it can be seen that all but three 
of the largest thirteen markets, are domestic markets, connecting Madrid with 
Barcelona, Las Palmas, Bilbao, Malaga, Palma de Mallorca, Alicante and Vigo. The 
three exceptional markets are routes to important European Union markets such as Paris 
and London. Therefore, it can be seen that location in these transport market matters. 
Table 2 shows the largest domestic markets in the year 2002. It can be seen that Iberia 
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dominates most of this densest markets, and Air Europa and Spanair serve three of the 
largest domestic markets that connect Madrid with Barcelona and Palma de Mallorca. 
Another remarkable element of Table 2 is the level of importance that the domestic 
market between Madrid and Barcelona represents. In total, this route represents more 
than 25 per cent of the total domestic traffic in Spain2. 
 
Table 2: Domestic Airline Traffic and Market Share in the Largest Domestic Airline Markets from/to 
MAD. 
Airline Airport Passengers Market Share 
Iberia Tenerife 382849 2.6% 
Iberia Valencia 386820 2.6% 
Iberia Vigo 401379 2.7% 
Air Europa Palma de Mallorca 414050 2.8% 
Iberia Alicante 437884 2.9% 
Iberia Palma de Mallorca 450122 3.0% 
Iberia Bilbao 459821 3.1% 
Air Europa Barcelona 464125 3.1% 
Iberia Las Palmas 601843 4.1% 
Iberia Malaga 693033 4.7% 
Spanair Barcelona 809327 5.4% 
Iberia Barcelona 2112845 14.2% 
Source: Martín and Betancor, (2004). 
 
With respect to European Union traffic handled by the air carriers (see Table 3), two 
characteristics are of importance: first there are no secondary airports in the largest 
routes, and second Iberia is still the incumbent airline but other former flag carriers and 
new entrants, such as Virgin Express compete fiercely with it in some markets. Table 3 
also shows that the importance of these largest routes is inferior to the one observed for 
in the domestic traffic, that is the domestic traffic is more concentrated around the 
largest routes than the European Union traffic. It also seems less convincing that HSTs 
could compete in these markets in the near future. Another important feature that can be 
noted is the loss of competitive force as a consequence of the formation of the 
Oneworld alliance. Tap, Iberia and British Airways are under the development of code-
                                                 
2 The European high-speed train network is currently at a medium stage of development, with a limited 
number of mainly unconnected lines, but a number of new links are planned in order to complete an 
European high-speed train network as part of the trans-European Transport Network. One of these 
planned links is the Madrid–Barcelona–French border line, which is currently under the last phase of 
construction. In fact, the new line is nowadays operative between Madrid and Lleida. Madrid–Barcelona 
services will run at up to 350 km/h, so that travelling times between the main cities on the corridor will be 
significantly reduced. It is difficult to anticipate the effects of the opening of this new line in the modal 
split between these two important cities of Spain. The potential for high speed trains (HST) modal shift 
was first demonstrated by France's TGV, which reportedly captured as much as 90% of the Paris–Lyon 
market. In Spain, the AVE service has over 80% of the Madrid–Seville market, compared to the 33% 
share held by conventional rail in 1991 (CAA, 1998).  
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sharing agreements that can affect the consumers’ surplus in these ten largest markets in 
the European Union.  
 
Table 3: EU Airline Traffic and Market Share in the Largest EU Airline Markets from/to MAD. 
Airline Airport Passengers Market Share 
TAP Lisbon 222573 2.4% 
Virgin Express Brussels 232363 2.5% 
Air Europa Paris 236901 2.6% 
Iberia Amsterdam 275152 3.0% 
Iberia Brussels 287067 3.1% 
Iberia Lisbon 294199 3.2% 
British Airways London 333755 3.6% 
Iberia Rome 343940 3.8% 
KLM Amsterdam 344228 3.8% 
Iberia London 482173 5.3% 
Iberia Paris 513705 5.6% 
Air France Paris 526761 5.8% 
Source: Martín and Betancor, (2004). 
 
Table 4 shows that the largest international markets by far are related to the trans-
Atlantic routes to the United States or to Latin America. The same patterns observed for 
the above markets are still present, that is, Iberia is by far the incumbent airline on these 
markets and the international traffic is less concentrated in these largest routes. The 
figures that appear in Tables 2-4 are usually referred to as segment traffic. The 
distinction between market traffic and segment traffic is usually important when figures 
of connecting passengers are not negligible. Market traffic counts passengers boarding 
at some origin airport and alight at some destination airport, irrespective of how many 
stops passengers have made. In this way, it is possible to count passengers that have 
made the trip directly, or with one or more stops. Segment traffic counts passengers on 
board nonstop flights, and includes passengers who are traveling on the same flight but 
perhaps with different origin or destination. Connecting passengers traveling to/from 
MAD represent an insignificant proportion of the total of passengers for most of the 
routes except for some long distance routes in Latin America.  
In summary, a brief characterization of the air traffic at MAD would read something 
like this: strong domestic linkages with simultaneous concentration of passenger volume 
on the main routes, primarily the routes to and from Barcelona, and other domestic 
routes to some industrial or tourist cities of Spain being Iberia the principal incumbent 
airline; strong European Union traffic less concentrated than the domestic one but with 
important linkages with the principal capital cities of Europe, as the airport is highly 
congested no secondary European airports present dense routes and Iberia share its 
incumbent role with other former flag carriers such as British Airways, TAP, KLM and 
Air France; and finally the densest intercontinental traffic is highly specialized in the 
trans-Atlantic routes to the United States and Latin America being Iberia again the 
principal incumbent airline in this market. It is against this background that the Spanish 
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airport authorities (AENA) have planned the most ambitious expansion programme that 
would allow the airport to double its present capacity. 
 
Table 4: International Airline Traffic and Market Share in the Largest International Airline Markets 
from/to MAD. 
Airline Airport Passengers Market Share 
Air Europa Havana 123892 2.1% 
Continental New York 129460 2.2% 
Iberia Lima 132360 2.3% 
Iberia New York 144659 2.5% 
Iberia New York 145800 2.5% 
Iberia Miami 152079 2.6% 
Iberia Mexico 182976 3.1% 
Iberia Havana 185736 3.2% 
Aerolineas Arg. Buenos Aires 198173 3.4% 
Iberia Buenos Aires 206215 3.5% 
Source: Martín and Betancor,(2004) 
 
 
Different pricing policies at Madrid Barajas 
 
Doganis and Nuutinen (1983) classified the services provided by an airport into two 
broad categories: aeronautical and non-aeronautical activities. The revenues from 
aeronautical services mainly encompass aircraft landing, parking and passenger charges, 
while revenues from all other sources are classified as non-aeronautical. The single-till 
approach takes not only aeronautical but also non-aeronautical revenues and costs into 
account to determine the level of aeronautical charges. The corresponding asset base 
comprises all airport assets regardless of their functions and characteristics. There may 
be cross-subsidies by revenues from non-aeronautical activities to cover the deficits 
from aeronautical services if a single-till approach is adopted. In other words, 
aeronautical charges could be set at a relatively lower level because of the existence of 
such cross-subsidies.  
Conversely, the dual-till approach separates aeronautical activities from non-
aeronautical ones. It determines the level of aeronautical charges by considering 
aeronautical revenues and costs only. Consequently, the corresponding asset base 
includes aeronautical assets only. Cross-subsidies are not permitted under this 
regulatory scheme. Aeronautical charges will be set at a relatively higher level under a 
dual-till approach than under a single-till approach. 
There is a large body of literature on airport pricing and cost recovery. Useful 
references include Levine (1969), Carlin and Park (1970), Walters (1973), Morrison 
(1983, 1987), Gillen et al. (1987), Oum and Zhang (1990), Oum et al. (1996), Zhang 
and Zhang (1997), Zhang and Zhang (2001) and Zhang and Zhang (2003). 
Morrison (1983) showed that if capacity is divisible and costs are homogeneous in 
volume/capacity ratio, then social-marginal-cost pricing leads to exact cost recovery for 
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the airports. Oum and Zhang (1990) showed that if capacity is lumpy, then social-
marginal-cost pricing would not guarantee cost recovery for the airport. Zhang and 
Zhang (1997) considered the effects of concession operations by the airports in a setting 
where capacity is divisible but social costs are not homogeneous in volume/capacity 
ratio. Zhang and Zhang (2001) obtained the optimal Ramsey prices, i.e., the mark-up of 
airport charge over the social-marginal-cost as a percentage of the full price that is 
inversely related to the demand elasticity3.  
First of all, it has already been discussed that there are only two groups of airport 
services: aeronautical and non-aeronautical services, each of which has specific 
aggregate demand and cost functions, and it is not difficult to anticipate that there are 
important complementarities between both activities4. In this section, we are going to 
follow a model that has already been used in the literature (Starkie (1998), and Zhang 
and Zhang (1997)). The term social welfare refers to the social welfare generated from 
aeronautical services only, while the social welfare created from non-aeronautical 
activities will not be discussed here. We define, as is common in the literature, that the 
social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. We will analyze the 
potential impact of different pricing policies using the values obtained on social welfare, 
and using the concept of ‘potential loss of social welfare’ developed by Lu and Pagliari 
(2004) when the lack of adequate capacity preclude the potential demand from using the 
airport. Social welfare generated from aeronautical services during hour i can be 
calculated as: 
0
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Where 
• ( )iP q is the willingness to pay (or utility) of airlines using aeronautical services 
when q units of aeronautical services are consumed during hour i; 
• iP  is the price charged for a flight using aeronautical services during hour i; 
• iq  is the demand (the number of flights) for using aeronautical services when 
price is set at Pi during hour i; 
                                                 
3 The authors also considered the situation where the demand for air traffic has a positive trend in the long 
run, and showed that the average airport charge will decline as the traffic increases over time in the long 
run. However, they argued that this situation is undesirable. The reason is clear: as the demand is low and 
the airport has excess capacity, airport charges are high while as demand increases and congestion builds 
up, airport charges are low. Putting it simple, they showed that when there is an excess capacity in the 
airport, the airport charge is above the social marginal cost, which would discourage an optimal use of the 
airport. However, when demand is approaching capacity, the airport charge will be below social marginal 
costs, which would encourage additional traffic that creates economic inefficiencies. In a sense, the users 
of the under-utilized airport are subsidizing the users of the congested airport. 
4 In fact, Beesley (1999) argued that the existence of important complementarities between aeronautical 
and non-aeronautical activities at major airports provides an adequate incentive for dominant airports to 
increase their output beyond the level that one would expect from profit-maximization behaviour obtained 
only from aeronautical services.  
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• c is the unit operating costs of providing each unit of aeronautical services; 
• Ki is capacity of aeronautical services during hour i; and 
• r is the capacity costs of providing each unit of aeronautical services. 
We assume that total capacity of airport aeronautical services for the economic life is 
fixed for each hour i. It is clear that due to externality constraints, the majority of 
airports impose some capacity limitations during the night hours and for this reason 
capacity may depend on the hour i considered. If we do not regard Ki as a fixed capacity 
(e.g., when a new runway is built), unit operating costs and capacity costs, c and r, may 
not be regarded as parameters of the model. If the number of flights using aeronautical 
services during hour i is less than capacity, the airport still has to spend capacity costs, r 
times Ki, to provide (and maintain) a certain level of quantity and quality of aeronautical 
services. Capacity costs may include fixed costs to build runways, passengers’ terminal 
buildings and taxiways, their depreciation and interest costs. 
Below, we will develop alternative airport pricing schemes that are linked to different 
conceptualizations of the objectives of the aeronautical services function. First, we will 
consider the case of a publicly owned airport whose objective is to maximize social 
welfare without any financial constraint5. Second the conceptualization of the “second-
best” situation will be developed. In this case, the airport is subject to a short-run break-
even financial constraint, i.e., the airport cannot receive any subsidies of the regional 
economy or they are not allowed to exploit profits beyond reasonable returns on 
aeronautical services. So the financial break-even situation is achieved period by period. 
And finally we will also employ the concept of the ‘market-clearing price’, where the 
airport tries to reach a situation where capacity is fully utilized. Thus, the market-
clearing price is the price at which demand is equal to the level of available airport 
capacity (CAA, 2002a). Setting aeronautical price at the market-clearing level ensures 
that airport users who are willing to pay the market-clearing price will obtain access to 
aeronautical capacity6, and that all capacity will be consumed. 
We will calculate the prices for each period of time for the different alternative 
pricing schemes and compare their gains (losses) in social welfare with respect to the 
pricing policy that was applied in the year 2002 by the Spanish airport authorities of 
MAD. We will also try to anticipate if some pricing policies based on single-till or dual-
till approaches may be possible under each scenario. 
In Fig 1-3, we represent the different situations that can be obtained when we 
calculate the market-clearing prices. D is the demand curve for aeronautical services, 
the x-axis and y-axis are the output level (the number of aircraft movements) and the 
price level of aeronautical services respectively. We have obtained the charts of the 
notice of airport capacity for the different days of the week for MAD during the summer 
season of the year 2002, thus we have obtained 168 pairs (Pt, Qt) corresponding to the 
seven days of the week and the 24 hours of each day. For the majority of the hours of 
the weekdays, we have seen that the potential demand is higher than the capacity. This 
situation is shown in Fig. 1, where slots are allocated following IATA guidelines. Under 
this allocation, there is no guarantee that slots are used by those airlines that value them 
most. The lower the aeronautical price, the more scarcity will prevail and it is more 
                                                 
5 This is the well-known situation called “first-best”, where price is equal to operating marginal cost. 
6 We will see below that this ‘market-clearing price’ may imply airport-subsidies to airlines due to the 
position of the demand curve for some periods of time.  
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likely that low-slot-valuation airlines could prevent high-slot-valuation airlines from 
obtaining slots implying some potential loss of social welfare. This outcome can result 
in substantial allocative inefficiency and subsequently reduce the level of social welfare. 
An efficient allocation of airport resources requires the price paid by any user to reflect 
the costs. In this situation, prices are not reflecting the “scarcity costs”, some airlines are 
purchasing particular airport services because they have obtained some privilege but 
they do not value them as highly as the opportunity cost of this scarce slots reveal7. 
 
 
Figure 1: Market Clearing Prices. Situation of Scarcity in MAD. 
 
During certain hours of some days, especially during weekends, the situation is better 
reflected by Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. In these situations, the scarcity costs are low or important 
excess of capacity exists. However, these situations share one common feature; the 
prices are higher than the first best prices. In order to obtain social welfare gains, it 
would be necessary to reduce the prices in both cases. It can be said that there is a cross-
subsidisation by revenues from these periods of time to cover the allocative deficits 
created in the situation discussed above, where the scarcity costs are really important 
because aeronautical charges have been set at a relatively low level. Accordingly, if the 
market mechanism based on demand and supply were at work, the equilibrium price of 
using the airport would need to be raised to the price needed to recoup the scarcity cost. 
In effect, as traffic exceeds the capacity of the airport, scarcity costs at the airport 
become an issue. This would allow many busy airports in the world to levy the so-called 
“peak-hour” surcharge. The purpose of this surcharge is twofold. Firstly, it would be 
possible to reduce the scarcity costs as the surcharge discourages demand for 
aeronautical services during busy hours when capacity has been reached. Secondly, the 
surcharge will produce extra benefits and reflect in a better way the real opportunity 
costs of slots, giving the correct signal to airport authorities for future expansions of 
airport capacity. 
                                                 
7Inefficient outcomes may be avoided if airlines who value the airport access the most get the scarce slots. 
For example, suppose that a Boeing 747 passenger jet operator values the right to land at 08:00 a.m. on 
Monday morning at €10,000 and some freight operator would also like to land at the same time values the 
access at €2000, then it would be socially more efficient to allow the B747 rather than the freight aircraft 
to land. 
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Figure 2: Market Clearing Prices. Situation of Moderate Scarcity in MAD. 
 
 
Figure 3: Market Clearing Prices. Situation of Excess Capacity in MAD. 
 
In summary, we look at different airport charges schemes and cost recovery policies 
where the capacity divisibility is not assumed. In this more general setting, we will 
study the optimal airport charge (“first best prices”) with other pricing policies, such as 
“second best prices” in which the financial constraint of cost recovery is considered for 
each period, comparing “market clearing prices” in which airport capacity is used at its 
maximum levels and actual prices. As discussed below, our results should contribute to 
the on-going debate in MAD and around Europe about the merits of adjusting airport 
charges to each situation in which airports may be involved. We will take into account 
the actual controversy about the merits of different price regulation with respect to the 
single-till or dual-till approaches. 
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The data 
 
We have been assisted by the Directorate of Slots Coordination in MAD in terms of 
data collection. The Directorate of Slots Coordination is the main coordinator for 
Spanish airport authority AENA and is in charge of the allocation of airport slots in 
accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) 95/93. The data presented in this section are 
based on slots requested and allocated as part of the biannual schedule coordination 
process. 
Capacity at MAD is reviewed twice yearly in advance of each scheduling season 
(winter and summer seasons). Capacity is assessed against an agreed average delay 
criterion. The process involves simulating the impact on average delays of adding 
additional slots at particular times of day. Where the additional slots do not result in a 
breach of the delay criterion, they are made available for allocation. 
 
Table 5: Madrid Runway Capacity: Slots per Hour-Winter 2003. 
Local time Arrivals Departures Total 
0:00 20 20 40 
1:00 20 20 40 
2:00 20 20 40 
3:00 20 20 40 
4:00 20 20 40 
5:00 24 20 44 
6:00 40 40 80 
7:00 40 40 80 
8:00 40 40 80 
9:00 40 40 80 
10:00 40 40 80 
11:00 40 40 80 
12:00 40 40 80 
13:00 40 40 80 
14:00 40 40 80 
15:00 40 40 80 
16:00 40 40 80 
17:00 40 40 80 
18:00 40 40 80 
19:00 40 40 80 
20:00 40 40 80 
21:00 40 40 80 
22:00 24 20 44 
23:00 20 20 40 
Total 808 800 1608 
Source: Martín and Betancor, (2004) 
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This process has resulted in a declared runway capacity that can be seen on Table 5. 
During the winter season of 2003, the number of daytime (06:00 - 22:59) slots available 
each day achieved the figure of 1364. The same capacity has been declared since 
summer 2001. The number of slots per hour generally varies around 40 arrivals and 40 
departures, with the following exceptions: 
Arrivals in the 05:00 – 05:59 and 22:00 – 22:59 periods are limited to 24 slots. This is 
largely due to the fact that environmental constraints on aircraft arriving at this time are 
applied.  
Departures in the 05:00 – 05:59 and 22:00 – 22:59 periods are limited to 20 slots. This 
is largely due to the same environmental constraints. 
Arrivals and departures in the 23:00 - 04:59 period are limited to 20 and 20 slots 
respectively. This is partly due to lower demand at these times and the prevalence of the 
Night Quota Period (23:30 – 06:00). Significant increases in capacity in these hours are 
likely to result in an unacceptable increase in unplanned aircraft movements during this 
Night Quota Period due to neighbouring vicinities annoyance. The number of 
permissible movements at night is strictly limited by a task group and the quota is 
already proving very controversial. 
Demand for MAD slots exceeds capacity by some variable margin for most part of a 
weekday. However, during weekends the demand does not usually exceed capacity. 
Over the 06:00 - 21:59 period, demand exceeded total capacity by 16% in a typical 
week for the summer 2002 season. Figure 4 below shows the detailed demand vs. 
capacity for a typical Tuesday. In this figure the extent of excess demand is clearly 
illustrated reinforcing the idea of MAD airport planners that the expansion capacity 
programme was required.  
 
 
Figure 4. Slot Demand vs. Capacity by hour in MAD. 
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The degree of excess demand for runway slots results in a high level of capacity 
utilization during the 06:00 - 21:59 period. The allocation data used here is based on a 
typical week in the summer 2002 season after the industry slot return deadline of 31st 
January 2002. This is the date by which airlines finalize their planned schedules. 
Based on the above analyses of capacity, patterns of demand and the resultant scarcity 
of runway slots at MAD, we will calculate the market-clearing prices for each period of 
time of the day. We will make some assumptions about the demand function for 
aeronautical activities. The functional form and the elasticity of the demand are the most 
critical points. There are not many studies analyzing the elasticity of the demand for 
aeronautical services. Kanafani and Ghobrial (1985) estimated that the elasticity of 
demand for flights was between -0.148 and -0.38, while in Australia, it was estimated to 
fall in the range of -0.1 to -0.225 for interstate flights in the early 1990s (CC, 2002). In 
our case, we will suppose that the demand function is linear and that the elasticity of the 
demand is -0.15. 
Doganis (2002) points out two reasons why demand for aeronautical services is so 
inelastic. First, aeronautical charges represent only a small part of an airline’s total 
operating costs (generally less than 8% for intra-European routes and 4% for trans-
Atlantic routes). However, the ratio of aeronautical charges to total operating costs 
varies from 7.8% to 13.2% for low-cost carriers. For this reason, using price 
mechanisms to allocate scarce capacity may more strongly affect these new low-cost 
carriers. Therefore, such policies may have unanticipated consequences on competition. 
There can also be equity implications as this approach will affect consumer groups 
differently. It is more likely that some low-dense or leisure routes (that are serviced by 
low-cost carriers) suffer an increase in aeronautical charges differently from other 
routes that are serviced by global incumbent carriers. 
A 50% reduction in aeronautical charges at one end of the route would cut only 2% of 
total operating costs for intra-European routes and 1% for trans-Atlantic routes. 
Secondly, airlines’ decisions on operating a route from and into the airport are primarily 
dependent on the level of anticipated demand for that route but not on the level of 
aeronautical charges. Therefore, if the above two examples prevail, price mechanisms to 
allocate scarce capacity may not be an effective option. However, it may be a better 
option if funding is provided to invest in additional capacity in order to reduce the 
scarcity costs created for a highly busy airport.8 
Crew et al. (1995) provide an interesting note about the fact that, in airports, peak and 
off-peak prices have not had the expected effects on demand shifting because of the 
level of persistence of non-price mechanisms, such as grandfather rights. These authors 
argue that the impact of the price mechanisms on demand shifts would be quite small as 
long as these rights prevail, and that only overall reforms on slot trading may provide a 
basis for applying efficiently any type of price mechanism. Their concerns certainly 
satisfy the equity considerations that have been explained above. 
In order to calculate first-best prices and second-best prices, we also need some 
information about the aeronautical charges and costs of the airport. The model shown in 
equation 1 uses the aircraft movements as the output variable, and it considers that 
airports operate under constant returns to scale9. 
                                                 
8 Funds for new airports expansion projects are provided by AENA. 
9Pels et al. (2003) showed that if air traffic movements are considered as the output, then the average 
airport of a sample of European airports is operating under constant returns to scale and under increasing 
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MAD bases its charges on the IATA guidelines and applies a maximum take-off 
weight (MTOW) price, which classifies the aircraft according to the weight and the type 
of market. It distinguishes three different weights (small, medium and heavy) and three 
different types of market (Domestic, European and International). The airport 
discriminates by these groups but it applies a uniform price during the 24 hours of the 
day. There is not any surcharge by peak time or night time or noisy aircraft. There is a 
large range of charges for different services like parking, aerobridge use, etc., but 
movements and handling charges are the most important ones.  
Aircraft characteristics have an important impact on aeronautical costs. The use of 
both the airport airside and landside facilities depend highly on operating characteristics 
of the aircraft that lands or takes-off at/from the airport. On the airside, the 
characteristics of the aircraft will determine the use of the runway and width, the 
minimum separation between runways and taxiways, the geometric project of taxiways, 
and the pavement strength. Additionally, environmental issues such as noise and air 
pollution are also based on the aircraft which will make use of the airport. On the 
terminal area, aircraft characteristics will influence the number and size of gates, and 
consequently the terminal configuration. Finally, the aircraft passenger capacity will 
influence the size of facilities within the terminal -such as passenger lounges and 
passenger processing systems -, and the size and type of the baggage handling system. 
The differences observed between the different aircraft that have used MAD facilities 
during the year 2002 may help explain the difficulty that we have found in order to 
obtain an average aeronautical charge. The results on the side of costs are even worse, 
because there is not a separation of costs that can be assigned to aeronautical and non-
aeronautical activities. For instance, runway length requirements range from 1,100 m 
(ATR-42) to over 4,400 m (DC-10-40), a difference of 300 %. The passenger capacity 
range is even wider: from 30 seats (EMB-120) to 400 seats (the capacity of B747-400). 
Finally, the maximum takeoff weight ranges from 11,500 kg (EMB-120) to over 
362,871 kg (B747-X). It is very important to have in mind that these differences would 
have implications on different costs and prices of air traffic movements (ATMs), since 
they have a high influence on the cost function for aeronautical services. Runway length 
is highly limited by land availability and land costs; the amount of runway required by 
aircraft is therefore an important determinant for the airport cost. Wheel track and 
wingspan determines the runway and taxiway widths, and the separation between those 
ways. Additionally, wingspan and aircraft length rules the design of the apron area. 
Pavement strength determination is based on the aircraft weight. Passenger terminal 
facilities are sized to accommodate peak hour demand, which is highly influenced by 
aircraft passenger capacity.  
Due to the lack of data availability and for the sake of simplicity, we finally decided 
to calculate an average aeronautical charge per air traffic movement, and we obtained a 
figure of 4650 euros per operation. With respect to the cost side, we have already 
mentioned that we did not have any disaggregate information for both aeronautical and 
non-aeronautical activities, so we have supposed that the proportion of revenues 
obtained by aeronautical activities over the total of revenues of the airport would be the 
same as the one observed on the cost side (42%). Thus, we got a very rough estimate of 
                                                                                                                                               
returns to scale if passengers are considered as the output. This situation suggests that it is an optimal 
policy both to increase the load factor of airplanes or the size of the airplanes. 
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aeronautical costs of MAD10. Traditionally, airports have relied on revenues raised from 
aeronautical activities; whereas non-aeronautical revenues have grown rapidly in 
proportion and in magnitude over the past ten years, partly because non-aeronautical 
services have generally fallen outside the scope of economic regulation, and partly 
because airports tend to earn more from non-aeronautical activities after the new role 
that airports are playing being units with more commercial orientation. Behnke (2000) 
points out that the ratio of non-aeronautical revenues to total revenues for a sample of 
more than 1,400 airports by Airports Council International had grown from about 30% 
in the late 1980s to over 50% in 199811. 
Many airports generate a much higher proportion of their revenues from concession 
activities rather than from aeronautical operations. Doganis (1992) has reported that in 
medium to large US airports, concession operations represent between 75 and 80% of 
the total airport revenue. Indeed, in 1990, more than 90% of the total revenue of Los 
Angeles airport resulted from commercial operations. Furthermore, concession revenues 
have grown faster than aeronautical revenues. For example, Hong Kong International 
Airport generated an equal amount of revenue from its aeronautical and commercial 
operations in 1979, while in the late 1980s and 1990s its concession revenue accounted 
for 66–70% of total revenue (Zhang and Zhang, 1997). 
We have calculated rough estimates of operating and capacity costs for Barajas 
airport, and their respective unit costs r and c per aircraft movement when capacity is 
fully used, using the percentage of capital cost over the total costs and supposing that 
this percentage is invariant on the aeronautical activities. In the next section, we will 
show the results of the different pricing schemes and the relationships between the 
different price mechanisms and the social welfare obtained. 
 
 
Social welfare implications 
 
Turning to equation 1 again, we will find that if we have an aeronautical charge that 
produces important scarcity costs (excess of capacity), then the price charged is lower 
than the market-clearing price. This situation is shown in Starkie (1998). In order to 
calculate the airline surplus, an extreme case is assumed where the whole tail of the 
excess of capacity (but low value) demand displaces an equivalent quantity of high 
value demand. Thus, the airline surplus, producer surplus and social welfare from 
aeronautical services will all decrease significantly. If the average aeronautical charge 
was also below the average aeronautical cost, the airport would have deficits from 
                                                 
10 It would be advisable to estimate a cost function separating aeronautical activities and non-aeronautical 
activities in order to obtain better estimation of unitary costs of aeronautical services. Lack of data 
precludes us from doing this exercise, so we finally use average operating costs (c=4200 euros) and 
average capital costs (r=1800 euros). In this last case, we make the assumption that airport is operating at 
full capacity. 
11 A number of airport operators, such as BAA, AENA and Schiphol Group, are attracted to become 
involved in the airport business all over the world due to the importance that the potential growth 
opportunities from non-aeronautical services present. This is usually reflected in the final bidding price 
paid. The operators need proper information about unexploited commercial potential in retail, trading, car 
parking, ground transport, and property development in order to bid with confidence. Retail operations, in 
particular, have become an important source of revenue for airports, and an area that airport operators 
have largely developed since privatisation. 
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aeronautical activities and would require cross-subsidization of these deficits by non-
aeronautical activities or the State taxes. The airline surplus during hour t can be 
calculated as:12 
2
0
( ) ( ) ( )
K q qt t t
t t t t t
Kt
CS P P q P dq P q P dq
−
= − + −∫ ∫   (2) 
It can be seen that if airport authorities set aeronautical prices as close to market-
clearing level as possible, then the potential loss of social welfare will be minimized and 
the excess of demand will be reduced.  
We proceeded to calculate the four alternative pricing schemes: first-best, second-
best, market-clearing and actual average charges. The results can be seen in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Alternative Pricing Schemes on Thursdays in MAD. 
 
Thursday is typically very busy in Barajas airport, and it can be seen that for most part 
of the day, the market-clearing prices coincide with the first-best prices because the lack 
of adequate capacity to attend the excess of demand prevails. It is also interesting to 
remark that for this reason, the first best prices are higher than the present and second 
best prices. For example, if airport authorities in MAD applied a first-best pricing 
scheme, they would raise the aeronautical charge by about 143% on Thursdays from 
11:00 to 11:59.  
Forsyth (1976) showed that there are three possible reactions for airlines to an 
increase in aeronautical charges: to raise airfares, to cut flights, or to switch operation to 
another airport. In May 2001, the ACCC decided to permit Sydney Airport Ltd. to 
increase aeronautical charges by 97%. If these increases were passed on to passengers, 
the increase in air ticket fares would add around $3.0 to a domestic return flight and 
                                                 
12 See Lu and Pagliari, 2004. 
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around $14.0 to an international return flight (ACCC, 2001). It is believed that very few 
passengers, as a result of these price increases, would alter their travel choice to another 
airport or cancel their flight.  
It can also be seen that when excess of capacity prevails, then first-best prices and 
market-clearing prices are lower than present average aeronautical charges. In this case, 
airport authorities would need to cut prices in order to reduce the potential loss of social 
welfare. This situation is common during the night hours. In the case of market-clearing 
prices, the airport authorities would even need to subsidize the use of the airport during 
these hours. This result would be difficult to implement due to the existing problems 
during the night hours with the surrounding vicinities. If airport authorities in MAD 
applied first-best pricing scheme, they would need to cut the aeronautical charge by 
about 68% on Thursdays from 00:00 to 04:59. This situation is not strange when there is 
extreme excess of capacity. Zhang and Zhang (2001) commented that Hong Kong 
airport charges were very high, but due to the severe under-utilization of the airport, the 
Airport Authority was obliged to review the charges in August 1999 and after lengthy 
negotiations with the airlines, the airport managers finally decided to cut the charges by 
15%, making this cut effective from 1 January 2000. 
In the following we will interpret and comment on the results of the different price 
schemes on the social welfare obtained from the application of the different pricing 
policies. The results for an average Thursday can be seen in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Alternative Pricing Schemes on Thursdays in MAD. 
 
It is interesting to note that the gains in social welfare of first-best pricing policies 
with respect to the present situation show a range from 3 per cent during night hours to 
11 per cent from 11:00 to 11:59. We have also obtained that if airport authorities set 
aeronautical prices to the first-price level, the average potential gains per year would be 
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about 6 per cent. If a second-best policy is applied the potential gains would be about 2 
per cent. Finally, if the use of the airport is expanded to its maximum declared capacity 
(market-clearing policy), the potential losses of social welfare would be about 17 per 
cent. It is also interesting to note that with the model assumptions, Barajas airport is 
being operated with cross-subsidization of non-aeronautical activities because the 
aeronautical prices are lower than the average aeronautical cost. 
 
 
Final remarks and conclusions 
 
Our results suggest that for the majority of the hours in the weekdays, potential 
demand is higher than capacity. For most parts of the day, the market-clearing prices 
coincide with the first-best prices because the lack of adequate capacity to address the 
excess of demand prevails. On the contrary, when there is excess of capacity, first-best 
prices and market-clearing prices are lower than present average aeronautical charges. 
In this case, airport authorities would need to cut prices in order to reduce the potential 
loss in social welfare. This situation is common during night hours. In the case of 
market-clearing prices, the airport authorities would even need to subsidize the use of 
the airport during these hours. Nevertheless, this result would be difficult to implement 
due to the existing problems during night hours with the surrounding vicinities. 
In summary, the relationship between airport pricing schemes and social welfare from 
aeronautical activities has been clearly established. It is shown that social welfare from 
aeronautical services will increase by 6 per cent if a first-best pricing scheme (rather 
than the present pricing policy) is applied in MAD (where aeronautical demand usually 
exceeds capacity for most part of the day during all the weekdays). We have also shown 
that a policy pursuing a higher level of capacity use does not provide a higher social 
welfare and for this reason such a policy must not be encouraged.  
However, it is clear that one of the caveats that this analysis presents is that the social 
welfare from non-aeronautical services has not been considered, and results can change 
significantly if there are strong complementarities between these two activities. The 
demand for non-aeronautical services is closely related to the demand for aeronautical 
services. An increase in the quantity consumed for aeronautical services will increase 
the potential demand for non-aeronautical services. 
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